
































Republica Moldova - the country of projects, concepts, strategies… 
3 September 2003  
 
 
In his speech of August 27 on the Independence Day celebrations, President Voronin 
stated "Never was Moldova so close to the European processes". The significance of 
the message is better grasped if compared to the previous two speeches of 2001 and 
2002 entitled "I do believe in Moldova's future" and "Independence is conditioned by 
the reintegration of the country".  
 
Interestingly enough in all his three speeches the President compared nowadays 
realities in the Republic of Moldova to the soviet times. In 2001 President Voronin 
claimed that "Republic of Moldova sovereignty should have played a destructive role 
within the union state". Moreover, back then he believed that "breakdown storm took 
URSS nations by surprise".  
 
One year later, in 2002, President's nostalgia for the soviet time was far less obvious 
in his speech. He stated "Each year we have some univocal feelings when celebrating 
Independence Day. The fate of our small country has proved to be too dramatic and 
the hardships we are going through too tough".  
 
Although still doubtful, this year President is far more optimistic. Now he believes 
that "It is important for us to keep in mind that in the aftermath of 1991 August Putsch 
this path was chosen by all the former URSS republics. Independence was a common 
option, which probably had no other alternative". This points to an evolution in 
President's vision towards the independence of the country. However, the key word 
here is "probably". This probably leaves room for doubts and most importantly 
justifies the huge discrepancy between the President's calls in the last two years to 
liberalize economy and democratize the society in view of European integration and 
Communist Party's program, headed by the President himself, calling for 
"reestablishing Communist society" in line with Marxist-Leninist theory and 
rebuilding URSS.  
 
Once we have reviewed the evolution in President's perception of the independence, 
let us consider the tasks outlined by the President for consolidating the country's 
independence. Thus back in 2001, implementing the "Republic of Moldova" project 
outlining the country's reintegration was a top priority. One year later in 2002 besides 
reunifying the country, corruption was added to the top priorities. As for 2003, 
country reunification is still a priority, however from a totally different perspective. 
Nowadays' message - European integration "is the most reliable tool for securing the 
country's integrity". Therefore, new priorities are defined each year, while the old 
ones unfortunately haven't been accomplished.  
 
It is worth considering what has been achieved so far in implementing the tasks 
outlined by the President. The goals of the "Republic of Moldova" project launched 
by the President in 2002 were outlined in his open letter to writer Ion Druta, i.e. 
edifying "Moldovan nation". This was to become the "integrating idea" consolidating 
a multi-ethnic society and enabling Transdnistria's integration to the Moldovan state. 
The intelligentsia was to promote this "integrating idea" among fellow citizens and 
young generation and make it accessible. Russian as the second state language and a  
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revised history course were to become the cornerstone of that project. Opposition 
responded to those initiatives by staging protest rallies for 4 months, which ended 
with a Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution imposing a moratorium 
on any revision of linguistic policy or history curricula. Things are still not clear. The 
most recent outcomes of the presidential initiative are: launching the concept of 
national policy, publishing a Moldovan-Romanian dictionary, and creation of a new 
Writers' Union, which supposedly would have to contribute to the enforcement of the 
plan. This time again opposition reacted promptly. Its leaders have already announced 
that they will resume the protest rallies by the end of the month. This is the logic of 
"settling once and for all" extremely delicate issues concerning ethnicity, language, 
history etc.  
 
As for the other objectives outlined in the President discourse, the country 
reintegration has slowly degenerated into federalization of the country, which bears 
some risks. And this for the sole reason that at least the core principles for developing 
a federative Constitution were not defined. Going back to fighting corruption, it 
wasn't even mentioned in the President's speech, albeit things have considerably 
worsened in the field. After the establishment of "vertical power", there is probably no 
reason to fight corruption since all key public officers are on the same side, in the 
same party.  
 
Under those conditions the governing has declared European integration as one of its 
strategic goals. However, there is a huge discrepancy between authorities' pro-
European messages and their daily practices, fact confirmed by OSCE final report on 
negative trend in the electoral process of the Republic of Moldova.  
 
One year ago, the President regretted the time wasted in promoting reforms since the 
country's independence. Indeed, Republic of Moldova has become the country of 
dozens of projects, concepts and strategies, a great majority of them being produced 
by the incumbent governing. However, none of the documents was completed in view 
of stability and prosperity of the country. This year only the governors adjourned 
three times the release of the European integration strategy. Moreover, the strategy 
degenerated into an eventual concept, which also wasn't and probably will never be 
made public. Now it is said the European Commission should be first consulted on the 
concept and only then it would serve for the elaboration of the strategy as such. We 
are well aware how long might the "consultation and elaboration" take, that is why the 
only thing for citizens to do is wait for new tasks for Moldovan society to be outlined 
in the future messages of the President.  
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Changes in the economic policy? 
9 September 2003  
 
 
Observers indicate that Government activity, especially of its economic bloc, would 
significantly improve after Marian Lupu was appointed as a Minister of Economy. He 
has the knowledge and experience qualifying him for this position. He represents the 
so-called "technocrats", skilled professionals for whom political orientation is of no 
great significance.  
 
Nonetheless, Marian Lupu's appointment is not an indicator of some crucial changes 
in the Government economic policy, but rather of his predecessors' poor results. This 
was confirmed by the Minister himself in his interview to the governmental weekly 
"Moldova Suverana" on August 27 when stating that the priorities of the Ministry he 
was heading "are in line with the priorities outlined by the President of the country 
and his team in as far as the pro-active economic policy is concerned…". The 
Minister referred to the priorities lying ahead: liberal environment for production and 
trade; favorable environment that would boost economy, and attracting foreign 
investments.  
 
The aforesaid tasks have been on the incumbent governing's agenda for the last two 
years. Noteworthy, in his address to the Parliament at the end of its first parliamentary 
session the President pointed that Republic of Moldova lacked a strategy and for it to 
happen economy liberalization was paramount. That address of summer 2001 greatly 
shocked the Communist majority faction, which had totally different tasks outlined in 
its political and electoral platform, namely building socialism and afterwards 
communism. From that moment on the President has been labeled as being 
"pragmatic", meaning that in taking decisions the President neglects official 
documents of the party and is rather guided by the need to survive on the political 
scene and stay in power.  
 
Those liberal metamorphoses of the President had been preceded by Republic of 
Moldova joining WTO and Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, paved by the 
previous ruling. At that time those events were viewed as a rather heroic act from the 
President given that the party press continued to libel the said institutions as tools for 
promoting the interests of NATO and American imperialism.  
 
Relations with international monetary organizations have developed along the same 
path, as IMF and WB were also libeled two years ago as tools of American 
imperialism. Gradually, acknowledging the fact that the country is lacking a 
development strategy has been replaced by acknowledging the need to develop an 
Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) in line with the WB 
recommendations. For PRSP to be properly implemented public administration should 
be modernized, stated President Voronin last year.  
 
Former Minister of Economy, Stefan Odagiu, was responsible for the PRSP 
elaboration, which should have been completed by this March. The deadline hasn't 
been met. On top of that, it is believed that Minister Odagiu wasn't qualified enough 
to effectively negotiate with WB and IMF.  
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Therefore, one may say that Odagiu's replacement with Marian Lupu was part of the 
plan to "modernize public administration". The latter involves Cabinet reshuffle for 
which Deputy Minister, Vasile Iovv, was in charge. His track record already includes 
revising local public administration system implemented after this year local 
elections. Probably the governors realized that permanent reshuffle does no good to 
the state apparatus image. For instance the funds spent for revising public 
administration system would have sufficed by far for renovating the schools and 
raising the meager salaries of the public employees, as the trade unions demand.  
 
That is why "modernization of the public administration" would resume only to 
changes in the structure of the Ministry of Economy, which according to the newly 
appointed Minister "should be tailored to the functional needs of regulating 
economy".  
Minister of Economy outlined in detail the actions to be undertaken in order to 
achieve the aforesaid. In particular "fiscal burden should be diminished for the 
business to get out of the shadow economy". For this to happen "authorities' actions 
should become credible".  
 
Interestingly enough, two years ago Prime Minister Tarlev said the very same things 
in his address to the businessmen congress. Nonetheless nothing has changed since. 
On the contrary, businessmen surveyed had even indicated that things worsened 
considerably lately. Moreover, businessmen repeatedly reported on increasing 
pressure from authorities, especially since the establishment of Department for 
Fighting Corruption and Organized Crime, which was overzealous lately in justifying 
its existence. On the other hand, for three years now Prime Minister Tarlev keeps 
announcing a campaign to fight smuggling of fuel. It's not clear what keeps Prime 
Minister from enforcing such measures, especially as reportedly they might bring a 
billion MDL to the state budget.  
 
Having said that, enhancing "authorities' credibility" might become a long-term 
problem. Furthermore, potential investors know far to well how Moldovan authorities 
view strategic investors such as Union Fenosa and the like. On top of that, the recent 
nationalization of the "Dacia" hotel was very conclusive.  
 
One of the top priorities identified by the newly appointed Minister is resume 
negotiations with IMF, as the suspension of its programs "hinders negotiations with 
Paris Club on restructuring the foreign debt". According to the Minister, it would be 
extremely difficult to maintain macroeconomic stability, which requires "a 
consolidation of the central administration efforts and mobilization of internal 
resources". Meanwhile, governors have identified two sources to cover its monetary 
needs - Central Bank loans and monetary emission without coverage. Financial 
analysts are already warning about the ever-growing inflation. As IMF ceased the 
funding, apparently authorities decided to settle their short-term problems without 
caring too much about impact they might have in the long run.  
 
The new Minister is probably right when claiming that "we should not rush to 
complete the negotiations with IMF on the expense of the quality of the negotiated 
document, so that we might end up with issues and misunderstandings arising later 
on", however it is probably too late already. He also stated that "negotiations with 
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IMF should be tough on professional level and not on the psychological one". This 
might lead us to believe that so far things had been done totally opposite. If so this  
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should come as no surprise to anybody. The thing is that the President's recent liberal 
pragmatism may not automatically annul the dogmatism of his fellow party comrades. 
The latter are characterized by an extremely inert force, which might as well act in the 
opposite direction to the course outlined by the new Minister of Economy.  
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One step forward, two steps back... 
6 October 2003  
 
President Voronin's negative reaction to the establishment of the Single Economic 
Area (SEA) by Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus has spurred some 
contradictory reactions among the Moldovan society. On the one hand, President 
Voronin's statement that SEA had undermined Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) existence and therefore Moldova stated that from now on Moldova would take 
firmer action towards the European Union brought hopes to opposition parties and 
press that the incumbent ruling party truly embarked upon European integration path 
and that it might even break away from CIS. Even media outlets affiliated to the 
ruling party indicated that they shared the same opinion.  
 
One the other hand, notable figures within the ruling party expressed their reticence 
with regard to President's statements. Therefore, the President was forced to declare 
that domestic press misinterpreted his words with regard the CIS future and the future 
of Moldova within CIS, for that matter. So, in the end the ruling party came back on 
track of its oscillating policies.  
 
It is worth clarifying certain issues here. Firstly, opposition was suspicious over the 
pro-European statements made by President Voronin one year ago. The best test for 
the authorities to prove their pro-European intentions was suggested by the Christian-
Democratic Peoples' Party, when last December they came up with the initiate of a 
consultative referendum for the people either to support European integration or 
oppose it. In doing so Christian-Democrats followed the logic that accession to EU 
should be preceded by some security guarantees, namely joining NATO. Apparently 
the referendum was intended to create a strong pro-European movement within the 
country, which would have compel political elite to follow it without many 
hesitations.  
Authorities' reaction to the Christian-Democrat's initiative was quite eloquent. On the 
one hand the referendum was thwarted on the grounds that, under the Constitution, 
Republic of Moldova is a neutral state. On the other hand it enjoyed mockery 
coverage in the governmental press on the grounds that referenda on joining EU are 
held only in the countries already accepted to the Union.  
 
Therefore, Moldovan authorities proved to be guided by other logic than the one 
recently tested by the ten East European countries accepted to EU. Apparently 
Moldovan authorities do not make a difference between a consultative referendum 
aimed to endow a clear strategic goal to the domestic policies and a referendum aimed 
at approving EU membership, which has a legal effect.  
 
This fact alone determined a wide skepticism towards the latest pro-European 
initiative of President Voronin. It seems that the pro-European initiative is only one 
element of a wider range of methods aimed at changing radically the negotiation 
format with Transdnistrian leaders. The thing is that after two years in power, the 
Communist Party has understood that its plan to settle the Transdnistrian conflict is 
not feasible within the old structure and negotiation format. To attract new parties 
interested in the settlement of the Transdnistrian conflict, authorities came up with the 
idea of European integration. Let's take a closer look at the sequence of events. After 
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a series of meetings with Vladimir Putin, Moldovan President made an appeal to his 
Russian counterpart, on the Russian TV, to recall its citizen, Igor Smirnov, from the  
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eastern territories of the Republic of Moldova. Voronin's message was left without 
any answer, while the number of meetings between the two Presidents dropped. Then 
followed OSCE draft proposal on federalization of the Republic of Moldova, and a 
couple of months later President Voronin came up with the initiative of Moldova's 
integration in EU. To attenuate somehow his initiative, during the CIS Summit held in 
Chisinau in October 2002, President Voronin suggested the entire CIS to follow the 
European integration path. Later, following the decisions taken at the NATO Summit 
in Prague and EU Summit in Copenhagen, President Voronin notified EU officials on 
his pro-European intentions and several weeks later he visited Washington and where 
he was promised US support in settling the Transdnistrian conflict. Meanwhile 
Christian-Democrats initiative to conduct the aforesaid referendum was rejected. At 
the same time a wide campaign against the breakaway regime was launched on the 
international scale. Accusations to the Tiraspol regime have been voiced at the OSCE 
Summit in Porto, at the Council of Europe, at the UN, etc. Indeed the campaign had a 
visible effect, especially when the Dutch Foreign Minister launched the idea of EU 
involvement in the resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict. Interestingly, when it was 
time to seize those opportunities Moldovan side was hesitant, could only express its 
gratitude to OSCE and other guarantor countries - Russia and Ukraine, and condemn 
"nationalism and separatism" that had divided the Republic of Moldova.  
 
One might deduce that what Moldovan authorities really wanted was just to make 
pressure on Russia without antagonizing it too much by means of international 
institutions interested in securing the future NATO and EU borders. Despite the tough 
pressure on it, with Russia's support Transdnistria managed each time to come up with 
"appropriate measures", as in the case of "economic and diplomatic blockade", 
"telephony war", etc. An illustration of the implicit pressure on Russia, which has its 
own interest zones in CIS, was the session convened by Prime Minister Tarlev to 
discuss the Conception of Moldova's EU integration held during the time of CIS 
Summit in Yalta. This session paved the way to the much-cited statement of President 
Voronin.  
 
Russian political elite was rather sarcastic when commenting on the event, whereas 
President Voronin together with governmental press rushed into denial claiming that 
opposition parties and press misinterpreted his statement. This might indicate that 
President Voronin has probably exhausted his entire stock of maneuvers therewith he 
was trying to pass the message that he needs to be backed up in the standoff with 
Tiraspol, otherwise Chisinau might breakaway from "Russia's influence zone". This is 
an illustration of political calculation and desire to stay in power in their worse.  
 
It thus has become clear that it is practically impossible to settle Transdnistrian 
conflict prior to the parliamentary elections, that is why electoral interests are taking 
center stage, whereas the much-promised resolution of the conflict by the end of the 
year - is adjourned until after 2005 elections. A simple calculation could show that the 
great majority of votes in favor of the Communist Party was cast by Russian speakers. 
According to the findings of opinion polls those citizens would rather go for CIS than 
EU. Meanwhile, the promises made by the ruling party on fighting corruption, settling 
Transdnistrian conflict, and poverty reduction are still not fulfilled. Moreover, given 
the worsening macroeconomic indicators the statement of the Minister of Economy 
that the foreign funding would not be resumed by 2005, i.e. after parliamentary 
elections, leaves room for speculations that Moldova is on the verge of a default, fact  
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confirmed by several economists, including those from the Communist faction in 
Parliament. This is not the end of bad news. A part of opposition is engaged in protest 
rallies, whereas the other is suspected of keeping liaison with Tiraspol regime and 
Russian authorities in order to win their support in the upcoming parliamentary 
elections. There are also some outstanding negative factors. One month ago Russian 
press alleged that President Voronin's son was supporting terrorists in Russia. 
Although there is probably little truth in those allegations, still they cannot be 
neglected.  
 
As the electoral interests seem to take the center stage, the only option left for 
President Voronin is to radically change his message into a pro-CIS one, tactics 
already tested by his Belarus and Ukrainian counterparts. There are already some 
signals in this respect. Notable personalities within the Communist Party have already 
started reviving the idea of "Europe united as far as Ural". Things would probably 
clear up after Vladimir Putin's visit to Chisinau. Analysts believe that if the visit takes 
place, the parties would reach an agreement on withdrawal of Russian munitions and 
troops from the Eastern region of the Republic of Moldova. Most likely a Russian 
military base would be established in exchange for Russia's pledge to continue 
supporting the "settlement of the Transdnistrian conflict by observing Republic of 
Moldova's territorial integrity and sovereignty", principles promoted by the ruling 
party. Of course European integration would not be forgotten, it would happen when 
the entire CIS would be ready for it.  
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Political concord 
13 October 2003  
 
 
Almost one year after the draft on settling Transdnistrian conflict via federalization 
was made public in Kiev, the Head of OSCE Mission to Moldova stated that the 
elaboration of a compromise political Agreement is underway, which would allow for 
a complete resolution of the conflict.  
 
This new approach is conclusive of the total failure of the previous approaches 
employed in dealing with the Transdnistrian conflict, or at best of their need of 
improvement. Indeed, there is only one document agreeable to Tiraspol leaders, 
namely the Memorandum signed in 1997, providing for the establishment of a single 
state by two equal subjects. This document was developed by the current pentagonal 
negotiation mechanism and was endorsed by Russia, Ukraine and OSCE. The draft on 
Republic of Moldova federalization was developed within the same framework and 
looks more like a draft Constitution of a federative state.  
 
On the one hand, 1997 Memorandum is a very general document, in contrast the Kiev 
draft is more detailed. The strange thing is that nobody remembers now about the 
draft, moreover the parties involved in the conflict, engaged in developing a new 
federative Constitution without having an agreement in principle regarding the draft 
released in Kiev. Despite the general understanding that it was practically impossible 
to develop a Constitution without having first an agreement in principle over the 
structure of the future state, it was preferred to concentrate on details. It took almost a 
year of international seminars under the aegis of OSCE to reach this conclusion.  
 
Apparently, the new initiative to develop a political Agreement has no chances of 
success. Normally, we should firstly answer the question "What shall we do with 
1997 Memorandum and Kiev draft?" Transdnistria and Russia claim that the current 
negotiation format as well the documents already developed are acceptable and need 
no changes. Although committed to settle the conflict, Republic of Moldova 
leadership refrains from taking a clear stance, instead resorting to maneuvers and 
appealing to international institutions. There are a number of reasons for such a 
tactics, however the most important is the Basic Treaty Republic of Moldova signed 
with Russian Federation, entitling the latter to protect Transdnistrian regime in legal 
terms.  
Consequently, it comes as no surprise that the ruling party rejected the discussion of 
an opposition Popular Party Christian Democratic (PPCD) draft statement on the 
failure of Russia to remove its troops from the Transdniester region. Communists, in 
the person of the Parliament Chair, Mrs. Ostapciuc, justified their decision by the fact 
that the motion procedures were not observed. On the other hand, the head of the 
Communist faction in Parliament, Victor Stepaniuc, who several years ago openly 
militated for examining the possibility of allowing Russian military basis in 
Transdnistria, justified the refusal to examine Christian-Democrats initiative by the 
Republic of Moldova's unwillingness to further complicate its foreign relations. 
Consequently, non-compliance with the motion procedures wasn't the real reason for 
rejection.  
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The funny thing is that Christian-Democrats' initiative was nothing but a sequel to the 
appeal to OSCE member-states to pressure Russia to comply with the decisions of the 
Istanbul and Porto OSCE Summits and withdraw its troops from Transdnistria by the 
end of 2002 and 2003 respectively. The ruling party rejected the initiative at the very 
time President Voronin publicly stated that at the next OSCE Summit in Maastricht 
Russia would have to report on the measures taken to enforce the aforesaid decisions. 
To put it differently, Republic of Moldova would like Russia to be pressured, 
however it does not want to be the target of its anger.  
 
Meanwhile, the Chief of OSCE Mission to the Republic of Moldova, William Hill, 
indicated that "Russia would not be able to evacuate its munititions from 
Transdnistria within the set deadlines".  
 
Technical and financial reasons are cited. These reasons seem to be true, however 
from a totally different perspective. Transdnistria demands its main supporter, Russia, 
to pay a reward for the permission to withdraw its own munitions from the Republic 
of Moldova. There is no doubt that the "financial litigation" between Russia and 
Transdnistria could go on forever under the Moldovan-Russian Basic Treaty. This fact 
does no good to the OSCE overall image, as it would have to extend for the third time 
the deadline for evacuating Russian munitions from the Republic of Moldova.  
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Asymmetric reasoning 
20 October 2003  
 
 
At the end of November expires Republic of Moldova's presidency over Council of 
Europe Ministerial Council. When in May Republic of Moldova took over the 
presidency, authorities made it clear they wanted to take advantage of that opportunity 
and take some measures in view of a faster resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict. 
During all kind of events held under the auspices of CE, as well as during various 
international forums, the President reiterated that one his top priorities as the head of 
state was settling the Transdnistrian conflict. Moreover, he condemned "separatism 
and nationalism", i.e. the separatist regime headed by Igor Smirnov and the 
nationalistic Christian-Democrat opposition. Authorities took the presidency very 
seriously and even made everything possible not to miss this opportunity. During one 
of the sessions of the Permanent Round Table the President confessed that it was very 
difficult for him to refrain from resorting to force against the protest rallies staged by 
the Christian-Democrats in January - April 2002.  
 
As it stands now at the end of the presidency, it turns out that the resolution of the 
Transdnistrian conflict hasn't evolved too much, on the contrary it is stalled. Thus, the 
elaboration of the federalist Constitution, viewed as the last ditch in solving the 
conflict, has reached a deadlock. To sign a political agreement with Transdnistria, 
negotiations have to be start all over again. Moreover, Communist authorities, who 
had hoped after their victory in elections for a fast resolution of the conflict, faced the 
bitter reality - Transdnistria sees itself as an equal partner to the Republic of Moldova 
in laying the foundation of the "contractual federation" and it always comes up with 
"appropriate responses" to all the "coercive measures" taken by Chisinau. The on-
going "telephony scandal" is a vivid illustration in this respect.  
 
To secure that Moldova's presidency wouldn't to unnoticed, Moldovan permanent 
representative, Alexei Tulbure delivered a speech at Council of Europe's Committee 
of Ministers that unleashed a real diplomatic scandal. He brought serious accusations 
to Romania and invited Council of Europe to mediate between the two countries.  
 
According to the allegations made on a contemptuous tone, which resembled much of 
the polemics between Turkish and Greek delegations in the European forums a couple 
of years ago, Romania was undermining Republic of Moldova sovereignty. Tulbure 
claims those actions included: Romania's refusal to sign a Basic Treaty with the 
Republic of Moldova; financial support provided by Romanian Government to pro-
Romanian opposition in Moldova; protectionist policy against the Moldovan products 
at the time Republic of Moldova was confronted with severe economic problems; 
Romanian support in teaching Romanian language and history in Moldovan schools, 
thereby promoting xenophobia and anti-Semitism; Romania's negative opinion on the 
federalization of the Republic of Moldova.  
 
In the opinion of the Moldovan side, all the aforesaid illustrate Romania's paternalist 
attitude towards Moldova, which in its turn leaves room for speculations to the 
Transdnistrian side on a would-be unification of the Republic of Moldova and 
Romania. Those speculations justify Transdnistria's uncompromising position in 
negotiations with Moldova. To put it differently, the failure to settle Transdnistrian  
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conflict stems from the Christian-Democrats' protest rallies and ultimately their 
supporter - Romania.  
 
Apparently, Moldovan authorities pretend not to understand where the real cause lies, 
although Transdnistrian leaders' economic interests and the exorbitant money they 
make out of Transdnistria, have been frequently cited. Firstly, breakaway regime had 
never been short of arguments in justifying its existence. For instance, in early 90's it 
was preserving Communist and URSS values, precisely what the incumbent ruling 
party in Moldova is striving for. After the breakup of URSS Transdnistrian leaders 
proclaimed themselves defenders of Russian interests in the Balkans. Nowadays, 
Transdnistrian leaders defend the interests of the "Transdnistrian people" by 
privatizing the patrimony of the region and even the land. Today, Transdnistrian 
propaganda claims it has nothing to do with the "obsolete Communist regime" of the 
President Voronin. Having said that, one may only wonder in how far Moldovan 
authorities are sincere when asking Council of Europe to mediate between Chisinau 
and Bucharest in view of settling Transdnistrian conflict. Following the same logic, 
Council of Europe might be well invited to eradicate the "Communist regime" in the 
Republic of Moldova, which in Smirnov's opinion is undermining the negotiation 
process by avoiding direct contacts between the two parties.  
 
However, Moldovan authorities do not accept such reasoning. What they prefer is the 
"asymmetric reasoning", which they applied on the one hand when accepting the 
current negotiation format and the 1997 Memorandum (providing for an equal status 
of Moldova and Transdnistria in creating a "joint state"), and on the other hand when 
they consistently plead for an "asymmetric federation". Transdnistrian side has all the 
reasons to believe that the "asymmetric federation" is nothing but an euphemism, 
thereby Transdnistria would be subordinated to Moldova. In this respect, they 
speculate first of all on the Communist authorities' manners in Gagauzia, especially 
when they incite hate and discord so as to eliminate top people in Gagauz 
administration and replace them with others more loyal to Chisinau ruling party. The 
latter is much more of an issue than the would-be unification with Romania. Under 
those circumstances, Moldovan opposition parties view as counterproductive or even 
dangerous the incoherent way Moldovan authorities play with federalization. This 
position was backed up by some Romanian officials as well, who are interested in 
securing their eastern borders.  
 
In the same asymmetric manner Moldovan authorities speculate on the "nationalist 
opposition" and their alleged supporters in Romania, however, refrain from 
speculating on those who are behind the curtains of the Transdnistrian regime. Still 
they may want to ask themselves: how does Transdnistria manage to survive being 
under "severe economic blockade" and on top of that manage to always come up with 
an "appropriate response" to Chisinau's actions? Nonetheless Moldovan authorities 
refrain from such questions, probably for the fear of some "appropriate actions" that 
might cost them loosing the power.  
 
No doubt the "asymmetric reasoning" stems out of the Communist authorities' 
preconceived ideas. For instance they openly state "even if Moldovan language would 
be tree times identical to Romanian it would be still called Moldovan for geo-political 
or ethno-political reasons" (see Comunistul of April 13, 2001). That is, the reality is of 
little importance, what really matters are the interest of the ruling party. Indeed, at the  
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time the statement was made Communists indented Moldova to join Russia-Belarus 
Union and to "launch the revival of the Communist movement in the post-soviet 
space". Those assaults on the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova (i.e. joining 
Russia-Belarus Union) are still present in the political document of the ruling 
Communist Party, which the party is not rushing to cancel. And this despite that at the 
closing meeting of the summer Parliament session Vladimir Voronin, the President 
and Chair of the ruling party, indicated that to probe them real politicians had to be 
careful and not to admit a disparity between words and actions.  
 
Pro Russia-Belarus rhetoric largely employed several years ago was aimed at 
convincing the main strategic partner, i.e. Russia, to endorse the "asymmetric 
reasoning" of Chisinau in its relations with Tiraspol. However, Russia assesses its 
interests according to totally different criteria. It does endorse "asymmetric 
reasoning", but in a contrary direction, one which is favorable to Tiraspol regime, as 
is the case of Georgia as well. This is exactly why Moldovan authorities are so critical 
of the CIS and declare "accession to EU" as their strategic priority. Western diplomats 
accredited in Chisinau salute the new course of Moldovan authorities, however 
remind that political component is of extreme importance in the accession process. 
Unfortunately, the latter has been worsening during the Communist rule. In other 
words, western diplomats agree with President Voronin when he says that disparity 
between words and actions should be eliminated. Probably to avoid accusations of 
inconsistency in enforcing the main party documents and its new strategic objectives, 
the incumbent ruling party has chosen to be consistent at least in one respect - 
constantly blaming Romania for undermining Republic of Moldova sovereignty. It is 
worth mentioning in this respect malicious articles targeted against Romania after the 
two countries failed to sign the Basic Treaty right on the eve of Prague Summit, not to 
mention the speculations that it might thwart Romania's accession to NATO.  
 
It would be wrong to believe that everything resumes to "asymmetric reasoning". The 
sad thing is that there is a pervert or no reasoning at all behind some of the Moldovan 
authorities' actions. How is Council of Europe's Ministerial Council supposed to react 
to the invitation to mediate between Republic of Moldova and Romania's bilateral 
relations? Romania had a clear stance on this. It regrets that the bilateral relations 
between the two countries were brought up on the international scale. It would be 
interesting, though, to see how Republic of Moldova would involve the Ministerial 
Council in mediating on the language in which the Basic Treaty is to be written. Let's 
see then Moldovan authorities explaining that although there is no difference between 
Romanian and Moldovan languages, the latter should still be called Moldovan for 
ethno-political or geo-strategic interests.  
 
Moreover, one may recall that two years ago Moldova was on the verge of a 
diplomatic scandal during the hearings on the Bessarabian Church in the European 
Court for Human Rights. One may well recall the outcomes of those actions. Thus, 
the former Minister of Justice, Ion Morei, who instigated the scandal in the first place, 
was ousted by the President for several reasons. Presidential press service disclosed 
that one of them was deteriorating the bilateral relations between Republic of 
Moldova and Romania via his incriminating speech at the ECHR.  
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It is worth mentioning that the diplomatic scandal instigated by Alexei Tulbure is 
undermining first and foremost the policy of good neighborhood relations Moldovan 
authorities declared to promote. This is the more important given that Moldova is still 
an extremely weak and vulnerable state and for it to recover a clear and consistent 
policy is needed. That is, exactly what President Voronin was saying when calling to 
eliminate the disparity between words and actions, which true in the case of disparity 
between party documents and strategic goals as well. Pragmatic approach, as 
authorities like to put it, is very important here. In the last three years of being in 
power, authorities came up with a dozen of strategies and conceptions on fighting 
corruption, insurance healthcare, poverty eradication, etc., all of which proved to be 
worthless. Now it's the European integration strategy, which already turned into a 
conception. From the prognostic point of view, Romania's experience should not be 
neglected, especially as it already succeeded a great deal in the aquis communautaire. 
Having the same language has its advantages especially in assimilating faster this 
huge experience. But this only the declared goal of accession to EU goes hand in hand 
with the real goals pursued, whereas "geo-political" considerations (see Comunistul of 
April 13, 2001) do not prevail over realities.  
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Ideological eclecticism generator of confusion 
20 November 2003  
 
 
A string of recent events are illustrative of Moldovan authorities' political and 
ideological eclecticism that is generative quite a number of confusions. Even so, in 
relations with their foreign counterparts, representatives of the incumbent governing 
choose to set themselves up for being promoters of social-democratic doctrine. And 
this especially after accession to EU was announced as one of the ruling party's top 
priorities. The shift in the Communist ideology began once President Vladimir 
Voronin, also Chair of the ruling party, was cited by the governmental daily Moldova 
Suverana (February 21, 2002) as saying "I don't want to build Communism in 
Moldova neither a developed socialism. In our times this is an utopia". This statement 
comes only one year after Communist Party reconfirmed during the 4th Congress held 
on April 22, 2001 that affiliation to Marxist-Leninist doctrine is its theoretical 
background and that its major goal is building socialism and communism in the 
Republic of Moldova.  
 
Communist rhetoric proved to be quite productive domestically. It is very popular 
with the elderly who have seen nothing but communism in their lives. An illustration 
to this end, are the messages voiced several weeks ago by the Communist high rank 
officials, including President Voronin himself, at the 10th anniversary of the 
restoration of the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova, as well as at the 86th 
anniversary of 1917 Bolshevik revolution.  
 
During the ceremony President Voronin tried to answer the question "Who are today's 
Communists in Moldova? And what is their future?" President's arguments were 
intended to counteract the dogmatic and "left radicals" of the party, who were accused 
of "political short-sightedness and naiveness". According to the President, they did 
not understand that "going back to socialism" via nationalisation of property is 
impossible, due to the fact that "in the Republic of Moldova almost each citizen has 
become an owner of private property". Reproaches to the effect that the Communist 
Party programme lacks a thesis on "dictatorship of the proletariat" were refuted by the 
following: "What kind of proletariat, what kind of working class are we talking about 
when the entire industry of the country has been ruined? Only a blind would not see 
such an obvious thing, i.e. in a very short period even the notion of working class has 
been totally devalued".  
 
Noteworthy, the "blind and naive" of the Communist Party might be right after all. 
From a historic perspectives all those who tried to exclude the basic thesis from the 
Marxist-Leninist practice were called opportunists and revisionists. Moreover, the 
most important thesis defined by Marx refers to Feuerbach. The most famous one: 
"Philosophers sought to explain differently the world, our task is to change it". Having 
said that, President Voronin is rather a philosopher trying to explain why it is 
dangerous to re-nationalise private property, or why the proletariat and working class 
had degraded in the Republic of Moldova. "Naives" believe that a true Marxist leader 
would have to change the state of affairs, especially when he has all the power to do it. 
Otherwise, it would be honest for him to relinquish Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, conduct 
the much-promised reform in the party and adopt an appropriate political program.  
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Apparently what President Voronin calls an "utopia" brings forward electoral and 
political gains, even if it generates all kinds of curiosities and confusions as well.  
 
For instance, according to some official estimates almost half a million of Moldovan 
citizens are true proletariats, however they are working abroad. Governmental 
agencies are negotiating with similar agencies abroad to legalise the export of work 
force from the Republic of Moldova. Therefore one may say that working class of the 
Republic of Moldova has become an extremely profitable export item ensuring the 
economic growth, which Moldovan authorities like to brag about for propaganda 
purposes.  
 
Naturally, a Communist party should have taken a raft of measures to repatriate its 
working class, whose interests they claim to represent. For this to happen policies 
aimed at attracting foreign investments are necessary, as well as opportunities for 
their employment should be provided.  
 
Those shifts in ideology have lead to some curiosities lately. On the one hand, 
Communist faction in Parliament signed together with opposition factions a statement 
featuring European integration as a top priority, on the other hand party press praises 
nationalisation of companies, party efforts to fight privatisation programs and contest 
property rights on land. However, it is known for a fact that one of the fundamental 
requirements for EU accession is a viable market economy. It remains to be seen how 
the Communist Party would contribute to a functional market economy via its 
political programme based on Marxist-Leninist theory.  
 
Another curiosity, while Communist newspaper was praising its Chinese counterparts 
for taking the path of reforms in the Marxist-Leninist spirit, international press 
featured the statement of the Chair of the State Property Commission of China, Li 
Rongrong. The statement reads that at the recent party plenary session a decision was 
taken on the privatisation of state companies. Further, the privatisation results would 
not be subject to any revision, whereas foreign companies would be allowed to hold 
the majority stake in privatised companies. Evidently, state would maintain control 
over the companies of strategic importance for the state security. It remains to be seen 
how Marxist-Leninist principles would be employed in explaining the aforesaid 
revolutionary events.  
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Memorandum on principles of establishing a unified state 
25 November 2003  
 
 
Kremlin administration's initiative on basic principles of the unified state has all the 
chances to be in centre of public attention of Moldova for quite a while. Both political 
figures and analysts agree that two factors determined the release of the 
Memorandum: upcoming OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Maastricht and not 
less important upcoming parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova.  
 
 
a) Maastricht factor  
 
Noteworthy, last year on the eve of OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Porto 
mediators made public another initiative on the establishment of "a contractual 
federation" between the Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria. The initiative was 
backed up by the mediator countries, i.e. Russia and Ukraine, as well as by OSCE and 
Transdnistria. Apparently, this time Kremlin decided not to repeat last year mistake 
when the document entitled "statement of intentions" was submitted to Moldovan 
authorities one day prior to the Porto Summit. Kremlin therefore failed to convince 
Moldovan authorities to accept the idea of "contractual federation". Furthermore, 
Moldovan Foreign Minister addressed international community at the OSCE 
Ministerial Council meeting warning on the threat posed by Transdnistrian regime to 
the security in the region, which exists mainly due to smuggling of munitions, drugs, 
and human beings.  
 
This year, however, Kremlin decided to go on its own, by-passing the pentagonal 
mediation mechanism, thus submitting the Memorandum to their Moldovan 
counterparts several weeks in advance so as to secure enough time to convince 
Moldovan side to accept the document. According to other opinions, Moldovan side 
co-operated with their Russian counterparts right from the beginning in drafting the 
Memorandum and failed to notify either Ukraine or OSCE. All in all, it seems 
Moldovan side will be the one to justify at the Maastricht Summit "Russia's failure to 
evacuate its troops from the soil of the Republic of Moldova".  
 
An evidence to this effect is the fact that immediately Memorandum was released, 
President Vladimir Putin himself clearly stated that Russia would honour its 
engagement to withdraw the munitions and troops from Transdnistria, only after 
Memorandum is accepted and implemented. Noteworthy, once both Moldova and 
Transdnistria accept the Memorandum, other parties to the pentagonal mechanism: 
Ukraine and OSCE holding on to the principle "we accept any formula of the conflict 
resolution that is acceptable to the conflicting parties" would accept it as well. 
Nevertheless, OSCE and the Republic of Moldova publicly expressed their lingering 




b) Electoral factor  
 
Indeed, electoral factor would play a key role in the Memorandum's acceptance by 
Moldovan authorities. Right now, Republic of Moldova ruling party has found itself 
in a quite delicate situation. Firstly, albeit the economic growth reported by official 
statistics three years in a row, economists, including those of the Communist faction, 
believe Moldovan economy is in pre-infarct state. Skyrocketed prices on energy and 
food have stymied social policies announced by the ruling party. When it comes to 
ideology Communist Party has shifted towards opportunism and revisionism, which 
in the long run might impair their ideological attractiveness. Out of all electoral 
promises made, ruling party has delivered only one - it revised local public 
administration system. The impact of the said revision in terms of boosting local 
government effectiveness is rather questionable. One may rightly claim that the only 
benefit produced by the said reform resumed to edifying a "vertical power", which is 
to be employed by the ruling party in pulling "administrative resources" in the 
upcoming elections.  
 
Since it decided to wield heavy pressure, Communist ruling has suffered a number of 
painful defeats in its relations with Transdnistria. The "economic blockade" supinely 
endorsed by Russia and Ukraine has lead to a considerable drop in bilateral trade 
between Chisinau and Tiraspol, Moldovan goods being totally replaced on 
Transdnistrian market by Russian or Ukrainian ones. Moldova also lost the telephonic 
war it had started against Transdnistria. Moreover, Tiraspol accepted President 
Voronin's call to stop the war on one condition, i.e. a bilateral agreement is to be 
signed by the parties, whereby undertaking to refrain from such measures in the 
future. This condition resembles a proposition to sign a "capitulation act" at the end of 
a lost telephonic war.  
 
Under those circumstances, the last-ditch for the incumbent ruling party and its 
Chairperson would be to go in the next elections as "country unifiers".  
 
In this respect we should mention that making concessions in conflict settlement has 
become already tradition in Moldova, especially on the eve of elections. In 1996 Petru 
Lucinski at that time Parliament Speaker build his electoral campaign around blaming 
President Mircea Snegur for instigating the bloodshed conflict, rather than the 
separatist regime. Later, on May 8, 1997 Lucinski signed a Memorandum, thereby 
granting Transdnistria equal rights to Moldova in the negotiation process, as well as 
the right to pursue its own foreign trade.  
 
After its victory in 2001 elections, conflicts remained to be the best tune of the 
Communist Party. For instance last year, after instigating a political scandal in Comrat 
that ousted Bashkan Dumitru Croitor, to promote their protege Communists promised 
to raise the legal status of Gagauz-Yeri, thereby enabling it to break away from 
Moldova under certain circumstances. It is true that later on they gave up that 
promise. This year also, on the eve of elections to Peoples' Assembly Gagauz-Yeri 
was promised the status of a federation subject in the would-be Moldovan federation.  
 
Bilateral relations with Tiraspol evolved along the same scenario. Soon after he had 
declared Transdnistrian conflict resolution as one of his top priorities, President 
Voronin discovered that breakaway leaders took the provisions of the 1997 
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Memorandum providing for equality of the parties equality, rather seriously. President 
Voronin wielded heavy pressure on the Tiraspol regime, which as mentioned above 
has failed. Under given circumstances, when there is one year left until elections, 
authorities have nothing but to follow the old tradition and make concessions. This 
time concessions are made under the cover of the so-called "asymmetric federation", 
which President Voronin wanted so badly.  
 
 
c) Possible outcomes  
 
Under Kremlin's Memorandum the representation of Gagauz-Yeri (4 Senate mandates 
per 100,000 citizens with the right to vote) and Transdnistria (9 mandates per 400,000 
citizens) in the Senate, the most important institution of the would-be federation, 
would be 7 and 4 times higher than that of Chisinau (13 mandates per 2,400,000 
citizens). Having said that, would anybody dare say that the proposed federation is not 
asymmetric!  
 
Secondly, the draft Memorandum provides for a ten-year transition period, wherein 
asymmetry would be applied not only in Senate representation, but also in decision-
making, i.e. by a majority of 3/4 out of the total number of mandates. Therefore, 
Tiraspol on its own would be able to veto any legal act, and this even without 
Gagauz-Yeri. However, this time asymmetry would work against Chisinau. 
Moreover, senators would be entitled to an imperative mandate, i.e. Transdnistria and 
Gagauz representatives shall vote as Tiraspol and respectively Comrat chooses to, 
otherwise risking to be recalled and replaced with others, more loyal to the cause 
pursued by the relevant subjects. Those are some additional measures aimed at 
ensuring the much-wanted asymmetry.  
 
Thirdly, throughout transition, federation subjects would preserve their own state 
institutions, whereas all the shocks of transitions would be attributed to the so-called 
"federal territory", i.e. what remains of the Republic of Moldova. The latter would 
have to take the blow and experience the effects of state structural reforms enforced 
within the framework of an unprecedented model Russian experts came up with. 
Moldovan authorities are already known for their ability to promote reforms, the more 
so as the state structure proposed by the Russian Federation is unique. Moreover, the 
latter is to comprise elements that were in open confrontation during the last 15 years.  
Viewed from this perspective, Moscow's compromise variant on the one hand enables 
Chisinau to use the adjective asymmetric against such a noun as federation, and on the 
other, guarantees Transdnistria and Gagauz statehood and on top of that entitles them 
to decide on internal matters of the "federal territory".  
 
And last but not least, the 12 yeas of independence have proved that in Moldova 
nothing is more stable than transition. The prerogatives Tiraspol and Comrat are to 
receive would allow them to decide on how long transition is to last on the federal 
territory, it may well happen that it would last until asymmetric federation would have 
totally discredited itself. And this because federal structures wouldn't have any control 
mechanism over the federation subjects, as the law enforcement forces would exist as 
separate units. Indeed, Chisinau would be entitled to one lever - each time to appeal to 
the Memorandum authors in Moscow asking them to interfere and pursue federation  
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subjects to comply with the Memorandum provisions. However, such a mechanism is 
far from being appropriate to a sovereign and independent state.  
 
The aforesaid might spur dissatisfaction among the public and might also worsen off 
the political stability in the country. One may not underestimate negative attitudes of 
the population towards a federation with a regime, labelled by the official propaganda 
as a "criminal and Mafia type". Citizens may rightly wonder whether authorities lied 
them when they had labelled Tiraspol regime as a criminal one, and if so, then why 
they had entered in a game with separatists in the first place.  
 
In addition, we should not forget that at the moment there is only one strategic 
objective that might consolidate the society, namely the Strategy of European 
Integration. This was confirmed in the President Voronin address to European Union 
back in 2002 as well as in the Joint Declaration of the three Parliament factions 
(ruling party and opposition parties alike) signed on November 14 confirming their 
cohesiveness in pursuing European integration.  
 
A quick look at the Memorandum would suffice to understand that it is far from being 
able to consolidate the society. Its implementation, as well as military guarantees 
propositions that followed, undermine the pursuit of European integration strategic 
goal. Moreover it does no good to the image the country projects abroad, when it 
agrees to solutions running counter to the publicly stated goal of European 
integration.  
All this because the conflict resolution plan is unilateral, as it comes from a power 
directly involved in the conflict and promoting its own strategic interests, as well as 
the interests of Russian citizens who usurped the power on a portion of Republic of 
Moldova territory. Those interests are quite different from those of the Republic of 
Moldova. The biased attitude of the Memorandum authors has been disclosed by the 
proposed federation formula that envisages an asymmetry unfavourable and 
discriminatory towards the Republic of Moldova. Moreover, Tiraspol has reiterated 
on numerous occasions that Transdnistria is a "Russian land". Therefore we should 
not even dream of Russia's full support in our European integration efforts, as it 
promoted the Memorandum and has been the main guarantor of its enforcement  
 
And those are just a few of the risks Republic of Moldova exposes itself to, once it 
accepts the Memorandum.  
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Would CEC preserve its independence? 
22 December 2003  
 
 
On December 16 Central Electoral Commission's six year mandate expired. Although 
under Moldova law CEC members could hold two mandates at most, Moldovan 
authorities chose to replace its entire membership. This radical change does not run 
counter to the law, however it raises eyebrows.  
 
Firstly, the replacement of the entire CEC membership undermines one of the 
cornerstone principles employed when the Electoral Code had been drafted back in 
1997, namely ensuring the continuity of the CEC activity. Continuity was to be 
ensured via a gradual replacement of the CEC membership, and that is exactly why 
the mechanism of two consecutive mandates was provided for. It was recommended 
by certain international organisations working in the electoral field, such as 
International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) and Association of Central and 
Eastern European Election Officials (ACEEEO). However due to the shortage of 
funding, Moldovan authorities accepted only partially the recommendations, thereby 
establishing a CEC with only 3 out of 9 members working on a permanent basis, i.e. 
Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Secretary, the other six being summoned only 
during electoral campaigns. During those six years both ACEEEO and other 
international organisations have made significant investments in the Moldovan CEC, 
by accepting it as a full-rights member, providing it with research and conference 
publications, exempting it from the membership fee.  
 
This investment proved to be worthwhile especially if judging based on the OSCE 
reports on monitoring elections. On the other hand, it is also true that the old CEC 
made mistakes and passed decisions that raised harsh criticism. An illustration to this 
effect was the decision to validate the results of a consultative referendum on 
replacing the existing form of governing with a presidential one held back in 1999. 
CEC decision back in 1999 indeed favoured President Lucinski who initiated the 
referendum in the first place. The thing was that the voter turnout was only 58.5%, 
and not 60% as was required by the law. Back then, CEC argued its decision by 
invoking a rather vague wording of the law, which in their opinion only recommended 
and not imposed the 60% voter turnout threshold. Another example of a quite 
controversial decision was CEC' last year refusal to register an initiative group calling 
on a consultative so as to assess whether citizens were in favour of joining EU and 
NATO. CEC decision was quite stunning due to the arguments cited, under the 
constitutional law citizens may not be preliminary consulted on issues that require the 
conduct of a constitutional referendum for a decision to be taken. In both cases it was 
quite obvious that CEC acted under the pressure wielded by the incumbent ruling that 
were pursuing their own interests.  
 
Although the examples cited above point to the fact that political meddling has had an 
impact on the CEC activity, it should be mentioned that those controversial decisions 
of the CEC were confirmed by the Supreme Court of Justice and Constitutional Court. 
Still the old CEC was characterised by a pluralism of opinion, fact that brought an 
added value and a progress in the electoral process. This fact was cited by the 
President of the country who had to thank the old CEC for its high professionalism, 
which was praised alike by the international institutions working in the electoral field.  
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Having said that, we may conclude that the old CEC was professional only when free 
of any pressure. Therefore, in order to improve the electoral process in the Republic 
of Moldova a mechanism should be found, which would thwart any attempt to wield 
heavy influence and that would build on the positive experience acquired. Moldovan 
authorities, however, chose another path, that is, to ignore the 6 year experience 
acquired.  
 
The second cornerstone principle employed in drafting the Electoral Code had been 
the impartiality of CEC members. To ensure CEC's impartiality, it was provided for 
that Parliament, Presidency, and Supreme Magistracy Council shall designate each 3 
members into the CEC. Back in 1997 those 3 institutions represented a broader 
spectrum or interests, which often ran counter or even zeroed each other, however 
nowadays those 3 institutions represent one single interest, that of the Communist 
Party. In this respect it is worth mentioning that Communist majority did not even go 
into the trouble of consulting the opposition factions when it came up with the 3 
candidates for CEC. The fact that judiciary in general and Supreme Magistracy 
Council in particular are under the governing control has been largely commented 
upon in the last two years, that is why we may rightly have some doubts about the 
candidates designated by this institution. And last but not least, last local elections 
were illustrative to the fact that the Presidency acted more like an electoral agent of 
the ruling party than a public institution. Indeed in his capacity as the President of the 
country, Vladimir Voronin, interfered in the electoral campaign by openly 
electioneering in favour of the Communist Party. We have further reasons to doubt if 
considering that one of the 3 persons designated by the President to the CEC is no one 
but the Chief of the control department over the enforcement of President orders. This 
new member of the CEC came to be known in the last elections when he served as 
Communist Party representative to the Chisinau electoral council. One week prior to 
his designation to CEC he published an article in the "Communistul" newspaper 
reporting on how well he had guarded Communist party's interests throughout the 
campaign. Based on the report, he was indeed an earnest guard of the Communist 
Party interests, fact which normally would disqualify him as a candidate to CEC, who 
should be first and foremost politically impartial. In this case however, on the 
contrary his service to the Communist Party was repaid fully by him being appointed 
as the Secretary of the CEC.  
 
Albeit Electoral Code provisions that CEC members may not be party members, it 
wasn't an obstacle for politicising the Commission. Formally, the membership in the 
Communist Party may be suspended; however it is still questionable whether such a 
formal measure would take over the party discipline or the gratitude for being 
promoted. That is why, opposition parties face a new challenge now, reconsidering 
the principles ensuring CEC impartiality. Otherwise one may not dream of free and 
fair elections in the Republic of Moldova in the near future. And this especially as the 
last OSCE report pointed to the fact that Moldovan authorities undermine free and fair 
elections when it comes to influencing their final outcome.  
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